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I. Introduction. 
  Until recently, no economist in the Austrian tradition had even begun to develop 
an Austrian theory of the firm (Loasby, 1989). This has now changed; a number of 
authors such as Lewin and Phalan (2000), Dulbecco and Garrouste (1999), Iaonnides 
(1998) Klein (1996) and Foss (1994) have contributed to an elaboration of such a 
theory. There has even been a dramatic growth of the works concerning this topic
1. 
For all their other differences, one thing all these publications have in common is the 
idea that knowledge and its distribution are, or should be, central elements any 
Austrian theory of the firm. Nevertheless, it seems to me that not all the implications 
of this important idea have been addressed. For one thing, the fact that knowledge is 
not only distributed but is also evolving has been relatively neglected, in the Austrian 
tradition in general and in the Austrian analysis of the firm. More specifically, an 
Austrian theory of the firm could improve the analysis of learning by systematically 
developing connections between knowledge and its distribution on the one hand, and 
time on the other. Learning, or the problem of the growth of knowledge, has become 
an object of research in economics in general.  
  In Kirzner’s approach, the idea that knowledge is unequally distributed and  that 
“alertness” can explain why some people are able to manage organizations better than 
others are based on the notion of entrepreneurship. However, he does not analyze
2 the 
structure of this “collocation of knowledge and decision authority” within the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992). This suggests that it may be worthwhile for an Austrian 
theory of the firm to integrate results of incentives-based and contractualist theories of 
the firm. 
  In this paper I will argue that the unequal distribution of knowledge implies that 
an Austrian theory of the firm must investigate two items. The first is the growth of 
knowledge within the firm (learning processes), the second the way in the rights to 
decide over the distribution of knowledge are assigned and controlled (the 
terminology is Jensen and Meckling’s, 1992). Finally, because those two elements are 
interdependent, we must define what their possible relations can be.  
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  The first section explains why the distribution of knowledge and its main 
determinants lead us to study learning processes and incentives. The second section 
shows how an Austrian theory of the firm can integrate particular results of the 
economics of learning. The third section argues that for an Austrian analysis of the 
firm it is even more important to investigate the relationships between incentives and 
the role of knowledge in the firm than it is for contractualist theories. The fourth 
section explains how an Austrian theory of the firm can integrate the elements 
analyzed in the previous sections. 
 
II. The growth and distribution of knowledge and the Austrian theory of the 
firm. 
  An Austrian Theory of the firm would consider the problem of the coordination 
of individual plans of actions as crucial. This problem, together with the emphasis on 
knowledge, its distribution and growth, the Austrian concept of time and subjectivism 
would distinguish such a theory from others (cp. O’Driscoll and Rizzo, 1996).  
  Existing Austrian theories of the firm already assume that knowledge is an 
essential element of any explanation of the existence of the firm. But I want to go 
further in this direction. Austrians try to explain the emergence of institutions 
(“organic institutions”), rules of action, conventions, traditions etc., as part of 
spontaneous coordination process. In this way, «  cognitive commonalities, that is, 
socially shared tacit knowledge including knowledge about social models of behavior, 
may emerge spontaneously from intense communication as an unintended collective 
outcome and may, as such, be difficult to influence. » (Witt, 1998, p. 166). Such a 
conception of the coordination process is important, but it is not the only one. They 
neglect the existence of what we may call  pragmatic institutions. Hayek writes 
however that "my central aim has made it necessary to stress the spontaneous 
evolution of rules of conduct that assist the formation of self-organising structures. 
This emphasis on the spontaneous nature of the extended or macro-order could 
mislead if it conveyed the impression that, in the macro-order, deliberate organisation 
is never important."  (Hayek, 1988, p.37). He adds that "the elements of the 
spontaneous macro-order are the several economic arrangements of individuals as 
well as those of deliberate organisations." (ibidem).  
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  In order to distinguish spontaneous and deliberate coordination processes, 
Hayek uses another distinction, that between concrete, codified and specific rules of 
conduct on the one hand, and  abstract, tacit and general rules on the other. This is 
tantamount to the distinction between general and specific knowledge. "Although 
Hayek is not always clear on this point, what distinguishes the two classes is not so 
much their origins as the nature of the rules they comprise. The rules of an order are 
abstract and independent of purpose, whereas the rules of an organization are concrete 
and directed toward a common purpose or purpose." (Langlois, 1993, p.169). 
  Hayek’s distinction between organizations and orders as based on that between 
specific (codified and concrete) and general (tacit and abstract) knowledge is not 
without shortcomings
3. As far as the firm is concerned, it is more useful to consider 
both as an institution and as an organization.
4 
  In order to exist and act, firms need some common body of knowledge, i.e., the 
« interpretative frameworks » of the members of a firm should be partially consistent 
with one another. That common body of knowledge sometimes emerges 
spontaneously. For example, Egidi and Narduzzo (1996) show how in an interactive 
context routines may emerge without there being a common will of the individuals 
involved. That indicates that both in societies as in smaller communities, spontaneous 
rules of action exist. On the other hand, Witt (1998) argues that, « sometimes … the 
institutional set-up of the interactions assigns certain individuals a position in which 
they get a chance to shape the communication processes and thus to exert an influence 
on the collective outcome.    The firm organization is a case in point. » (Witt, 1998, p. 
166). Depending of the aspects we study, the firm can either be considered to be a 
spontaneous and a deliberated created order. 
  An accepted distinction in economics is that between ex ante and ex post modes 
of coordination. The former indicates the possibility for individuals to agree on some 
common commitments
5 before transacting, the latter some mutual-adjustment of 
individuals’ actions. This seems very similar to the Austrian distinction discussed 
above. However, the Austrian framework is richer in content. First, because time 
matters and  because coordination  processes cannot be reduced to coordination 
modes.  An Austrian theory of the firm needs to take into account both evolution of 
coordination mechanisms, and in addition the evolution of individuals’ knowledge  
 
5
inasmuch as knowledge conditions those mechanisms and is conditioned by them. 
Second, the ex ante and ex post modes of coordination are usually considered as 
exclusive, that is to say the former characterizes the firm and the latter the market
6. 
According to the Austrian theory of the firm those two modes coexist within an 
organization. 
  The first point is essential. In fact, according to Menger (1976) the growth of 
knowledge is an important explicative element. Indeed, when he criticizes the Smith’s 
theory of the economic progress he says that what explains fundamentally this 
progress is the increasing of the knowledge individuals have of the relations between 
their economic ends and the set of the ordered economic goods. In the same way 
when he analyzes the emergence of an organic institution such as money, he 
emphasizes on the fact that individuals are learning form those who are more 
highlight than them. This self-reinforcement process ends up in the emergence of an 
institution. It is then difficult not to consider that learning is a cornerstone of 
Menger’s analysis. If we then conceive the firm on the basis of the structure and 
evolution of knowledge, it is justified to look at the way it is possible to introduce 
learning as an important element of the organization and evolution of the firm. 
  According to the second point, the fact that individuals either act without any 
inter-individual commitments or with bilateral contractual constraints make the 
coordination of their action very different. In the first case individual behavior is not 
restricted by any constraints that are not concerning his own wealth, in the second this 
behavior is engaging the wealth of those with whom he has agreed on some collective 
results. As far as knowledge is concerned, the problem becomes interesting because 
what is in question is not only the management of the coordination of behaviors but 
also and much more importantly the management of the coordination of knowledge. 
In other words if knowledge is dispersed and unequally distributed between 
individuals what are the consequences of such a phenomenon in terms of distribution 
of the decision rights? In this way I will show below that two kinds of problems are 
induced by this aspect of the coordination process (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). The 
first is concerning the assignment of decision rights and the second is dealing with the 
possibility to control the actions on the basis of the distribution of decision rights.  
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  Indeed as far as the relations between knowledge and coordination processes are 
concerned we are then faced to two different problems. The first is concerning the 
organization and evolution of individual knowledge in relation with the coordination 
processes, and the second is link with the way the dispersion of knowledge influences 
the way coordination is designed en enforced. 
 
III. Learning models and the Austrian theory of the firm. 
  Learning in economics, perhaps because of i ts novelty, is very differently 
analyzed. However, three mains way of analyzing learning processes can be identify. 
- The most important part of the literature is dealing with what can be called “strategic 
interacting individual learning”
7. This way of analyzing learning is essentially due to 
some recent developments in game theory and is mainly interested with the way 
individuals are modifying their beliefs or their behaviors in a context of interactions. 
- Another conception of learning considers that organizations are learning. Such a 
view seeks to show that the way an organization is set up explains its capability to 
increase its reactivity to some modifications of its environment. As an example 
Marengo (1992) analyzes the adaptability of an organization as depending on its level 
of centralization. 
- The last one is based on the evolutionary theory of learning. Such a conception is 
due both to evolutionary game theory and more generally to evolutionary economics. 
This kind of learning is called “social learning” (Fudenberg, Levine, 1998). 
  There is a strong parallelism between those three kinds of learning processes 
and the way it is possible for Austrians to analyze the evolution of knowledge. Indeed 
first, individuals learn because they are confronted to a changing environment, 
second, organizations learn because of some recurrent interactions between 
individuals belonging them and between different organizations, and third, individuals 
learn without knowing that they do. 
  Most often, learning in economics is analyzed from a behaviorist point of view 
(Garrouste, 2000a). However an important literature is based on the idea that it is 
necessary to take into account the fact that individuals have beliefs on their 
environment and, first that those beliefs are  determining the way individuals are  
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behaving, and second that the individuals’ beliefs are evolving. This second point is 
essential as far as learning processes are concerned. 
  As an example, Walliser (1998) defines two kinds of learning processes based 
on two types of rationality
8. The first, behavioral learning is based on the idea of an 
instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality “deals with consistency between 
given opportunities and fixed preferences, in order to derive intended strategies from 
previous expectations” (Walliser, 1998, p. 68). Behavioral learning is then the 
individual’s capability to improve this consistency between given opportunities and 
fixed preferences. As an example an individual can learn to play those strategies that 
have been given to him the best results in the past. 
   The second kind of learning, the epistemic learning, is based on the idea that 
cognitive rationality which “deals with consistency between available information and 
constructed beliefs, in order to form expectations about the relevant environment” 
(Walliser, 1998, p.68) can be improved when not perfect.. 
  This second kind of learning is essential inasmuch as it is not far from the 
Austrian conceptions of knowledge. Even if the models of learning in economics are 
often based on some behavioral considerations, it is possible to look at some of them 
as rooted in a cognitive conception. In game theory
9, learning can be linked with 
cognitive processes. For example in “fictitious play” models as well as in 
“reinforcement”
10 ones, where individuals revise or update
11 the beliefs they have on 
the others’ strategies, it is possible to assimilate the learning process to a cognitive 
one. Indeed in “fictitious play” “each player assumes that every other players are 
choosing according to a fixed probability distribution and that these distributions are 
independent among players. Thus the player in role i (‘player i’ for short) computes 
the observed frequency distribution of the actions taken by each player j up to time t, 
adopts this as a maximum likelihood estimate of the distribution player j is actually 
using, and then chooses a best reply to the product of these estimated distributions.” 
(Young, 1998, p.31). 
  Such models can be considered as too strong in terms of the assumptions they 
share concerning individual rationality. However some recent contributions tend to 
relax those assumptions.  
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  In order to illustrate such an evolution I will take the Young’s contributions 
(1993, 1996, 1998). Indeed Young introduces a model characterized by “four key 
features: boundedly rational responses to forecasts of others’ recent behavior, which 
are estimated from  limited data and are perturbed by  stochastic shocks.” (Young, 
1998, p.43). 
  Then if the individuals have the possibility to make errors with a given 
probability e, that is to say that they choose their actions in the set of their best replies 
with probability (1-e); if they have a limited memory (m the number of the past 
rounds they remember); and if they are determining their actions on the basis of 
information by looking at a part s of the population, then some interesting results 
follow. Indeed some conventions are able to emerge that are characterized by the 
following properties: 
- They are linked with a path dependent process, that is to say that in two societies 
where the initial conditions are the same, « there is a positive probability that at any 
given future time, they will be operating different conventions. » (Young, 1996, p. 
111). 
- A convention is not necessarily an optimal solution. In fact, it is not because a 
solution is selected that it is the best one. 
- There is a local conformity effect: «  if all agents have a positive probability of 
interacting, if they have sufficiently incomplete information and if random deviations 
have sufficiently low probability, then most of the time, most of the population will be 
using the same convention. » (Young, 1996, p. 111). 
- A  global diversity effect. In others words two societies can «  choose » different 
conventions. 
- There is  a possibility for a convention to change radically and rapidly. This 
punctuated equilibrium effect is important because it excludes a lock-in effect that 
traditional analysis of technological competition? à la Arthur (1985) shows. 
  Such an approach can evidently be criticized from an Austrian point of view. 
One of the main shortcomings as far as knowledge is concerned is due to the 
following assumptions: first individuals have all the same memory, second their 
rationality is bounded because they can make errors (a random choice) with a given 
probability and play the best response with the complementary probability.  
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  However it can be useful to introduce those kinds of phenomena inasmuch as 
they explain the emergence and evolution of conventions in a way which is not to far 
from the one Austrians do. All the models listed above are considering that 
individuals are learning because they interact but they are not analyzing the possibility 
for organizations to learn too. 
  The idea that is at the basis of organizational learning process is the following. 
The fact that individuals are interacting locally and recurrently produces some 
“composition effects”, that are making the evolution of the all organization 
independent on the individuals’ actions, but strongly dependent on the architecture of 
this organization. 
  Concerning this learning process, its “conformity” with the Austrian tradition 
depends on the way it is conceived. If the idea is to say that an organization as such is 
learning, it is difficult to accept that an entity that is not self-conscious can be 
considered as a subject and can act as an individual does. If the idea is to consider 
that, because individuals are interacting recurrently they develop progressively some 
specific collective knowledge, this kind of learning process is much more acceptable 
from an Austrian point of view. This kind of learning process is able to explain why 
firms are different even if they are belonging the same kind of economic activity, that 
is to say why something like a corporate culture emerges which is “the stock of 
knowledge which is common to substantial portion of the employees of the firm, but 
not to the general population from which they are drawn.” (Crémer, 1990, p.54). This 
kind of learning process is analyzed both  by game and by evolutionary theorists. 
Indeed according to game theory the fact that individuals interact with their neighbors 
and not with the all population implies some interesting results (Young, 1996; 
Mailath, Samuelson and Shaked, 1997). 
  In a very d ifferent way evolutionary theories of the firm as well as 
organizational economics explains why some collective knowledge emerges from the 
accumulated competence of the firm (Marengo, 1992; Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo, 
1996). This kind of organizational learning is differently conceived but such ideas as 
complementarities between activities, synergies between individual knowledge, 
positive externalities between assets are all at the basis of this type of conception of 
learning processes. The now important literature on the routines of an organization  
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(Cohen and al., 1996) is emphasizing on the emergence (Egidi, Narduzzo, 1996) and 
the evolution (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi and Egidi, 1991; Nelson, 1995) of some 
collective behavior which is fundamentally dynamic and organically linked with an 
organizational learning process. Eventually the so-called knowledge-based theory of 
the firm (Conner and Prahalad, 1996) is one of the last example of this developed and 
still developing literature. The drawbacks of those models are due to the lack of any 
references to the incentives
12. Although individual learning models are explicitly or 
implicitly assuming that individuals learn in order to improve their own wealth, 
organizational learning models are considering that “all agents are ‘angels’ as their 
motives are concerned.” (Dosi, Levintahl and Merango, 2001, p.5). 
  It seems very fruitful for the Austrian theory of the firm to integrate the results 
of the theories listed above. In fact as far as the evolution of dispersed knowledge is 
concerned the idea that learning is essential needs to be analyzed seriously by the 
Austrian tradition. Even if some of the assumptions are too strong it could be 
interesting to amend them in order to propose a much more satisfying theory of the 
firm (see below section IV). 
 
IV. Including incentives into an Austrian Theory of the Firm 
  Holmström (1982) writes that « Orthodox economic theory has little to offer in 
terms of understanding how nonmarket organizations, like firms, form and function » 
(Holmström, 1982, p. 324). He adds that this problem is due to the fact that such a 
theoretical viewpoint pays very «  little or no attention to the role of information ». 
One of the main interests of the “contractualist” theories is then to analyze the way 
incentives are built up when opportunism, asymmetries of information and uncertainty 
are taking place. 
  In a recent paper, Holmström and Roberts (1998) analyze the way contractualist 
theories of the firm are able to explain the boundaries of the firm. They present the 
way agency theory defines the boundaries of the firm. They interestingly write that 
« information and knowledge are at the heart of organizational design, because they 
result in contractual and incentive problems that challenge both markets and firms. 
Indeed, information and knowledge have long been understood to be different from 
goods and assets commonly traded in markets. In light of this, it is surprising that the  
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leading economic theories of the firm boundaries have paid almost no attention to the 
role of organizational knowledge. » (Holsmtröm and Roberts, 1998, p. 90). It can be 
assumed that this kind of evolution is linked with the fact that agency theory 
borrowed some interesting elements from the Austrian tradition. It is for example 
symptomatic that all those theorists are often quoting Hayek (1945)  The Use of 
Knowledge in Society in their works. 
  Adverse selection and moral hazard as well are the starting points of some 
interesting analysis of the firms inasmuch as the incentive systems are determined by 
the possibilities of the existence of pre or post contractual opportunism. In fact, 
agency theory, property rights theory, incomplete contract theory as well as 
transaction costs economics bring to the fore the problem linked with the transfer of 
knowledge and information. 
  However knowledge is usually assimilated to information and the problem is 
limited to the difference in the capacity to obtain information. Such a conception of 
knowledge is too far from the way Austrians use to analyze it. Indeed according to 
Langlois and Garrouste (1997) knowledge cannot be reduced to a stock of information 
but need to be conceived as a structure inasmuch as “the neural system of the brain 
(and, more generally, the nervous system as a whole) creates, with experience, a semi-
permanent structure or ‘map’ that guides action –not only in response to new stimuli 
but also through processes of internal reclassification and recombination”. (Langlois, 
Garrouste, 1997, p. 289). However as far as knowledge is concerned the problem is to 
look at the way the firm is organized. One of the basic Austrian idea is that the 
entrepreneur needs to be the one who has the relevant knowledge to organize the 
activities of the firm. In other words the more an individual knows the higher he has 
to be in the hierarchy. Indeed such an Austrian and Knightian conception is shared by 
those who develop an Austrian theory of the firm. However the problem is open for 
what is concerning the way the right to decide is assigned and how the decision-
makers are controlled. Witt (1998) says that the entrepreneur needs to persuade his 
actual as well as potential employees to adopt his ideas. In a way that is not far from 
Demsetz (1990), Foss and Foss (2000) considers that ownership needs to be given to 
the individuals with the more important part of relevant knowledge. Those  
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conceptions are interesting but they do not solve completely the problems we identify 
behind. 
  Indeed, even if they both analyze the relation between the unequal dispersion of 
knowledge and the allocation of authority, they solve neither the problem of the 
repartition of the authority to decide inside the firm nor the way the decision-makers 
are controlled. 
  Some interesting propositions are coming from agency theory as w ell as from 
property rights theory and are based either on the idea that the organizational structure 
of a firm is linked to the kind of knowledge concerned (Jensen and Meckling, 1992) 
or on the allocation of the authority to decide (Hart and Moore, 1999). 
  Jensen and Meckling (1992) is on some points close to Foss and Foss (2000) 
and starts from the famous Hayek (1945) The Use of Knowledge in Society in order to 
analyze the relations between the kind of knowledge, specific or general, and the 
organizational structure of the firm. Their point is to say that specific knowledge is 
costly to transfer although general one is not. “Because it is costly to transfer, getting 
specific knowledge used in decision-making requires decentralizing many decision 
rights in  both the economy and the firm. Such a delegation, in turn creates two 
problems: the rights assignment problem (determining who should exercise a decision 
right), and the control or agency problem (how to ensure that self-interested decision 
agents exercise their rights in a way that contributes to the organizational objective).” 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992, p. 251).  Then they define ownership as the right to 
decide along with the right to alienate that right where alienation is the right to sell a 
right and to capture the result of the exchange. If they agree with the Hayekian idea 
that the distribution of specific knowledge in society calls for decentralization they 
consider that he never discusses how “market automatically move decision rights to 
the agents with the relevant knowledge” and why “those agents will use the decision 
rights properly” (Jensen and Meckling, 1992, p. 252). Their idea is to explain what is 
the consequences of the unequal dispersion of knowledge on the collocation of 
knowledge and decision authority (moving knowledge to decision authority or 
authority to knowledge) when alienation is absent (as it is the case inside the firm). 
Their point is to say that there is a trade-off between “cost owing poor information” 
and “agency costs”. Indeed the manager has to assign the decision to those with the  
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relevant knowledge, but doing so he increases the cost due to the potential 
inconsistency of objectives. They show that there is an optimal location of decision 
right as far as this trade-off is concerned. Such a conception is not too far from the 
Marengo’s model (1992) that present a trade-off between centralization, that is low 
coordination costs but low learning capability (because knowledge is homogenous) 
and decentralization that is high coordination costs but high learning capability 
(because knowledge is heterogeneous). 
  In a quite different way Hart and Moore (1999) present a model where hierarchy 
is a way to allocate authority to decide. The idea is to say that the owner of the assets 
has the right to decide how those assets are going to be used. Because he has limited 
capacities and time to set up a decision, he can delegate to some subordinate who 
have the same constraints and can delegate, and so on. There is then a “command 
chain” where individuals are located from the point of view of their right to have an 
idea concerning the use of a sub-set of assets. Thanks to some strong assumptions 
they show
13 that an optimum organizational form is characterized by the following 
conditions: first the probability to have an idea is increasing as the right to have an 
idea is decreasing and second criss-cross organizations are never optimal. This kind of 
model of hierarchy is not too far from the Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) one even if Hart 
and Moore assume that there is no possibility for the one who delegates to choose to 
whom he delegates. 
  Those two ways of analyzing the relations between knowledge and decision 
rights are very interesting for those who, as Austrians do, consider that the unequal 
dispersion of knowledge is determining the way the hierarchy is organized inside the 
firm. This is by no mean to say that Austrians need to integrate those models as they 
are, but the idea is to consider that it can be powerful for it to be inspired by them. In 
this way Foss and Foss (2000) attempt to propose a model that shows why the 
ownership needs to be linked to the individuals with the relevant knowledge is an 
example of direction of research that try to conciliate both the specificity of the main 




V. Linking learning and incentives into an Austrian theory of the firm. 
  In the previous two sections I have shown that it was interesting, if not 
necessary for the Austrian Theory of the firm to integrate some results coming from 
the “economics of learning” as well as some coming from models that are analyzing 
the relations between the dispersion of knowledge and the assignment and control of 
decision rights. In this section I want to present some directions of research that seem 
interesting when one is interested with the relations between the growth of knowledge 
(that is to say learning) and the problem of incentives. According to Dosi, Levinthal 
and Marengo (2001) “we find that there is an important interaction between problems 
of knowledge and problems of incentives.” (Dosi, Levinthal and Marengo, 2001, p. 
6). 
Those relations are of two types: 
  First as far as learning (that is the increase of knowledge
14) is concerned it is 
interesting to look at the reason why learning is important for firms. In other words, 
what are the incentives for firms to induce some learning process. 
  Second if the firm has some interests to induce learning processes, it has to 
solve two problems that are 1) how it is possible to deal with the problem of the 
workers’ incentives to learn, and 2) what the individuals belonging the firm have to 
learn. According with the first problem, the answers are depending upon the kind of 
approach one proposes. According to the evolutionary conceptions of the firm 
learning is increasing the firm efficiency. The notion of routines in its dynamic 
significance (Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992) is conceived as inducing a search 
behavior from the firm in order for it to become more efficient. However, such an 
increasing in neither monotonic nor going without problems. Indeed, Egidi and 
Narduzzo (1996) show that any changes in the routines of a firm provoke in a first 
time a sub-optimal outcome because of the modifications induced both on the 
individuals’ actions level and on the level of the coordination of individuals’ actions. 
Those modifications destroy the old routines and a period of time is needed for the 
new routines to take place. 
  According to the contractualist theories of the firm, 1) learning is usually 
assimilated with the effects of training inasmuch as those theories are only able to 
deal with comparative static problems and 2) training is conceived as a mean for firm  
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to increase the abilities of its workers or to screen those abilities, and for the workers 
to signal their real abilities. The problem is here only an agency one and inasmuch as 
knowledge is an unobservable variable it is not at all considered as an important 
phenomenon but it is dissolved in the effective workers’ behaviors. 
  According with the second problem, it is possible to accept the idea that the 
growth of knowledge inside a firm is in part not possible on its own without the 
individuals’ agreement. If then learning is not a natural phenomenon (due for example 
to classical agency problems) it is therefore necessary for the firm to solve the 
problem of how it is possible to motivate the individuals’ learning activities. In other 
words the firm needs to stimulate the individuals to learn by designing some 
incentives contracts (Weiss, 1995; Statt, 1998) or by providing the appropriate 
environment for them to learn. (Nonaka, Takeuchi, 1995). In the contracts the firm 
propose to its employees, the possibility, not only to stipulate an increased wage 
depending on the results of their ability after the learning process, but also to define a 
reallocation of the decision rights is an important aspect which is in complete 
coherence with the Jensen and Meckling (1992) point of view. 
  Such a problem of incentives is also analyzed in an evolutionary perspective. As 
an example, Coriat and Dosi (1995) show that routines need to be conceived as a 
locus of conflict, of governance as well as a way of codifying incentives and 
constraints. Accordingly the constitution of a routine inside a  firm is sustained by 
some incentive or control mechanisms. Dosi, Levintahl and Marengo (2001) analyze 
this problem when they propose a model that links the performance and the rewards to 
the “fitness value of the entire policy string, or some partition of this boarder string.” 
They use the Kauffman (1993) landscape model in order to analyze the relation 
between the real decomposition scheme and the organization decomposition, and they 
define the rewards in terms the proximity of the two decompositions. 
  However, it is also important for a firm to know what individuals’ capabilities 
are essential to develop and consequently  what kind of learning processes it is 
interesting to sustained. In this way the notion of “core competence” is linked with the 
idea that  a firm needs to develop and then to support the development of those 
knowledge that are compatible with the competencies that are belonging this “core” 
(Cohendet, Llerena, 1999). Such an idea is not too far from the Hayek’s one when he  
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writes that the performance as well as the existence of a firm is “often bound up with 
the preservation of at least a certain continuity in its personnel, the preservation of at 
least an inner core of men right down the line who are familiar with its peculiar 
traditions and concrete tasks.” (Hayek, 1960, p. 302). However such a compatibility 
does not implies that the diversity inside an organization needs not to be promoted. 
Indeed Loasby (1989) and much more precisely Marengo (1992) show that in order to 
be efficient a firm n eeds some variety between individuals’ characteristics to exist. 
According with Marengo (1992) the manager of a firm has to deal with a trade-off 
between i) low coordination costs, a low dispersion of knowledge and low learning 
capabilities, and ii) high c oordination costs, a great dispersion of individuals’ 
competencies and high learning capabilities. 
  All those different aspects, which are usually not taken into account by the 
Austrian conceptions of the firm may end up in the following consequence: is an 
Austrian conception of the firm always necessary to develop? In fact if many different 
theories are able to propose solution to Austrian problems is there any place for a so-
called Austrian theory of the firm? Indeed my point is that the answer is yes. In fact 
what distinguishes the Austrian approach of the firm and what cannot be integrated in 
the contractualist theories of the firm is first that knowledge cannot be reduced to 
information and second that learning is a process. In this way, it is not possible to 
reduce the incentives to a sum of rewards and punishments defined on the basis of the 
actual individuals’ outcomes but those incentives need to be defined looking at the 
evolution of the outcomes as based on a learning process. Indeed the Austrian theory 
of the firm has to take account the relations between the growth of knowledge and the 
system of incentives, but it needs not to reduce those relations to its static dimensions. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
          The Austrian theory of the firm is based on the idea that knowledge is important 
because it is unequally dispersed and that the coordination of individual plans of 
action is consequently a complex phenomenon. However such an idea needs to be 
completed by some developments concerning two of the main characteristics of 
knowledge inside the firm. The first is that knowledge is evolving due to the fact that 
individuals are learning. The second is that as far as knowledge is dispersed the  
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structure of the organization, particularly the distribution of the decision rights, can 
depend on this dispersion. In this contribution my aim has been to examine the 
content of the extensions that the combining of those two phenomena, that is to say 
learning and incentives, are able to induce as far as the Austrian Theory is concerned. 
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1 It is not my aim to explain such a growth but it can be linked, on the one hand to the consequences 
that the main characteristics of the Austrian tradition have on the way economics is actually conceiving 
what the firm is (Foss, 1994), and on the other hand to the theoretical effects of the introduction of the 
New Technologies of Information and Communication that are based on the transfer of information and 
knowledge 
2 Foss and Foss (2000) and Witt (1998) are some important exceptions. 
3 See for example, Langlois (1993), Vanberg, (1996) or Garrouste (2001) 
4 See Garrouste (1999). 
5 The way the agreement is obtained and the kind of commitments that are taken are important but are 
only analyzed below. 
6 In fact an important literature is trying to justify that some hybrid forms are existing. 
7 We do not take into account some important part of the literature in the domain of learning that is 
devoted to individual learning without strategic interactions which is close to decision making theory. 
See for example Garrouste (2000b) for a “Austrian” model of individual learning without interactions. 
8 Our aim is not here to analyse the notion of rationality. For some interesting contributions see, Foss, 
(2000), Langlois (1997), Conlisk (1996), or Rubinstein (1998). 
9 See Young (1998) or Fudenberg and Levine (1999). 
10 Young (1998) considers that reinforcement learning is a behavioral one. In fact it usually considers 
that individuals adopt past actions that yielded a high payoff and avoid the ones linked with a low 
payoff (Young, 1998, p.28). However, while the initial reinforcement models are based on those 
assumptions (Bush and Mosteller, 1955), Fudenberg and Levine (1998) show that a probabilistic 
versions of fictitious play where individual’s probability to choose an action is linked to its expected 
payoff according to beliefs that individual forms as in fictitious play are identical to reinforcement 
models (depending on how the expected value of an action is calculated). See also (Erev and Roth, 
1998). 
11 In fact, it is necessary to distinguish «  the revising context where the message completes or 
contradicts the initial belief about static world, and the updating context, where the message gives some 
recent information on a dynamic world. » (Walliser and Zwirn, 2000). 
12 Dosi, Levinthal and Marengo (2001) constitute a recent exception (see below). 
13 Their results are much more important than this one but it is not my aim the reconstitute here all their 
arguments. 
14 It is important to emphasize on the fact that learning, in an Austrian perspective needs to be 
fundamentally considered as linked with the growth of knowledge and not only with the improvement 
of the individual or collective behaviors. The improvement of the behavior is a consequence of the 
increase of knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 